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Abstract 
 
In October, 2015 Kaspersky released an analysis of 
the bootkit “HDRoot”. Their analysis highlighted 
mistakes in the bootkit, which made it ineffective at 
performing its task. Upon attempts to replicate that 
analysis however, it appears that these conclusions 
were in error and the bootkit works with any Windows 
version in the last 16 years. HDRoot represents a 
serious commitment in time and effort to develop, and 
an in-depth analysis reveals the work of a significantly 
capable threat actor. The sample analyzed here dates to 
2013, and is the same sample Kasperky reports to have 
analyzed in their post. However, all evidence points to 
Kaspersky performing analysis with a 2006 sample, 
likely the reason for their conclusions. Additionally, 
mistakes made in reporting the capability of offensive 
software, provided without means to verify, hurt the 
security industry by misleading practitioners and 
limiting their ability for informed decision making. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Kaspersky attributes the HDRoot malware to the 
WINNTI group, a threat actor that they connect to 
Chinese origins [1]. This analysis looks at a dropper for 
HDRoot and the installed bootkit code, and does not 
attempt attribution or analyze any other samples linked 
to HDRoot. The dropper is capable of installing any PE 
executable as the payload for the bootkit, but does not 
come bundled with any default payloads. As such, this 
report offers no insight into the various payloads used 
by the authors in practice. For information on the other 
malware associated with the WINNTI group, see Trend 
Micro or Kaspersky’s reports on the group [2] [1]. This 
analysis does, however, offer a very in-depth look into 
the technical workings of the HDRoot bootkit and its 
components.  
Also addressed in this work are a number of 
technical inaccuracies and misrepresentations in 
Kaspersky’s SecureList post of October 2015, “I am 
HDRoot! Part 1,” which was the only research on this 
sample to be published prior to this paper [4]. 
Kaspersky’s research was very helpful getting started, 
but it soon became apparent that their analysis was not 
actually performed using the sample identified by MD5 
in the article and thus could not be relied upon. This is 
believed to be the reason for many of their criticisms of 
HDRoot, which they call, “not what you expect from 
such a serious APT actor.” The sample analyzed here is 
not free of criticisms, but all of the problems addressed 
by Kaspersky appear to have been fixed in the sample 
their post lists the signature of. Other faults and 
weaknesses, however, are addressed. 
 
1.1. Sample 
MD5 Hash:   
 2c85404fe7d1891fd41fcee4c92ad305 
SHA1 Hash: 
 4c3171b48d600e6337f1495142c43172d3b01770 
 
Original Name:  net.exe 
Product Version: 6.1.7600.16385 
Time Stamp:   2012/08/06 13:12:39 UTC 
Produce Name: Microsoft Windows Operating 
  System 
Retrieved from malwr [3]. 
 
2. Overview of Architecture  
 
The malware examined here can be broken into 
several stages. The 64-bit dropper, which was signed 
with a stolen certificate that has since been revoked, is 
the first component that is executed. The dropper installs 
the bootkit to the hard drive along with a backdoor 
executable to be run on subsequent boots. The backdoor 
is supplied as a command line parameter to the dropper 
and can be any Win32 or Win64 executable.  
Upon boot, the computer will execute the 
maliciously installed MBR, which loads a subsequent 
component that is named here as the “verifier”. It is a 
single sector block that verifies that the rest of the 
bootkit and the backdoor are intact before running them. 
The bulk of the bootkit’s work is done by the next 
component, rkImage. The name rkImage actually comes 
from the interface of the dropper, which explicitly refers 
to it when installing the bootkit. rkImage works by 
manually reading the file system from the disk in order 
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to write the backdoor (the generic term used to refer to 
the payload) into the filesystem and redirect a Windows 
system service to launch the backdoor.  
When rkImage is finished it transfers execution back 
to the original, non-infected MBR and allows Windows 
to boot normally. The booting system will run the 
backdoor instead of the replaced system service, but will 
then restore and start the legitimate service after the 
backdoor has ran, hiding the fact it was ever replaced.  
 
3. Dropper  
 
The dropper is designed to disguise itself as the 
Windows system utility net.exe. The properties on the 
executable attempt to mirror the settings found on a 
Windows 7 version of the utility, reporting it to be a 
Microsoft program. When run without parameters, 
HDRoot shows the options menu as if it were net.exe. 
That is where the similarities end, however. 
 
The dropper executable, while masquerading as the 
Microsoft net command, has been signed with a digital 
certificate belonging to Guangzhou YuanLuo 
Technology Co, Ltd, a firm based in the city of 
Guangzhou, China who had their signing certificate 
stolen by the WINNTI group. The certificate has since 
been revoked, and, if the signing time and compilation 
dates on the executable are to be believed, it was signed 
in 2013 almost a year after this version was initially 
compiled.  
Figure 1. Dropper disguising itself as net.exe 
 
3.1. VMProtect 
  
A notable hindrance to reversing the dropper is that 
it was packed using VMProtect. Unlike most packers, 
which decompress and then jump to the original 
executable code, VMProtect converts the x86 opcodes 
into an automatically generated language of bytecodes 
to be interpreted in its own emulator. Attempting to 
statically analyze the sample would prove an arduous 
task. Instead of x86 instructions, the main contents of 
the program exist in the language of the automatically 
generated emulator, and the only intelligible 
instructions left are for interpreting these opcodes. 
There have been a few unpacking plugins for Ollydbg 
written for certain versions of VMProtect, but these are 
generally found in forum posts and are not well 
maintained. This is most likely the reason Kaspersky did 
the bulk of their analysis with a different sample that 
was almost, but not quite, functionally the same. Not 
wanting to spend time tackling VMProtect, a number of 
other techniques were used to analyze artifacts instead. 
 
 
Figure 2. Graph overview of VMProtect's 
emulator. 
 
When the dropper obscured with VMProtect is run 
with any of the legitimate net command parameters or 
with unrecognized parameters, no output is given. The 
only commands that provide output are the valid 
HDRoot commands programmed by the authors. 
Kaspersky, by analyzing an older sample from 2006, 
was able to get a “help” output, rather than the “net” 
output, which contained a list of commands for that 
version. This was not present in the 2013 sample 
analyzed here, unfortunately, and the VMProtect 
obfuscation makes finding a command list through 
normal reverse engineering means prohibitive. Most of 
the previous commands still worked on the newer 
sample, and all of the commands were five or less 
characters in length. Even short words like install were 
abbreviated to “inst”, rather than left intact.  
Since the Kaspersky command listing was half a 
decade older than this sample, and some of the 
commands from their listing were no longer present, a 
simple, and very slow, fuzzer was written to attempt to 
check all possible commands of five or less characters. 
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Given the length of the other commands and that input 
appears to be case insensitive, this appears to be a 
reasonable approach. The code for the fuzzer can be 
found in the supplemental files on the author’s website. 
Screenshots for each command can be found there as 
well. No additional commands to the ones Kaspersky 
detailed were found by the fuzzer and Table 1 contains 
the complete list of known commands. 
 
Table 1. HDRoot dropper commands 
 
Command Description 
check Checks for the presence of the 
bootkit and the integrity if 
present. 
clean Removes the bootkit. 
inst <Backdoor> Installs the bootkit 
info <Backdoor> Shows information about the 
checksums and requirements 
for an executable if it was 
installed as the backdoor. 
 
3.2. DEBUGFILE.sys – A signed kernel driver 
 
At the time the dropper installs the bootkit, no 
changes to the filesystem or the registry are seen 
between snapshots taken before and after. The approach 
used was to run the dropper in a continuous loop in a 
virtual machine, suspending the VM, and analyzing the 
resulting memory image. Performing memory capture 
from outside the VM appeared to be the best option 
because there were a number of anti-debugging 
techniques employed along with the anti-disassembly. 
Using Volatility, two more PE files were discovered that 
the dropper extracted inside the process, but none of the 
four clear text resources Kaspersky claimed to have 
extracted from a memory dump, providing further proof 
that they did their analysis on a different sample than is 
listed in their blog post. The two PE files found were 
kernel drivers, one 32-bit and one 64-bit. The 64-bit 
driver is signed, as is required by 64-bit versions of 
Windows, using yet another stolen certificate, while the 
32-bit driver is not signed. This certificate belongs to a 
South Korean video game company, Neowiz. The 
certificate, unlike the one for the dropper, has yet to be 
revoked. 
The use of the kernel drivers is fairly 
straightforward. Without kernel access there is no way 
for malware to write directly to the physical disk as there 
are no Windows API calls available to user land 
processes for doing so. The dropper writes out the 
appropriate driver to the file DEBUGFILE.sys in 
C:\Windows\system32\Drivers, and then creates a 
service for it. This shows up in the memory image as a 
registry handle to HKEY Local Machine with the path 
System\ControlSet001\services\DEBUGFILE. The 
service runs and the driver \Driver\DEBUGFILE is 
created. DEBUGFILE.sys is also deleted from the disk.  
The driver is used by the dropper to proxy its direct 
access to the physical disk. A number of things are done 
in this process. The original MBR is backed up and then 
overwritten by the new bootkit MBR, and then weakly 
encrypted components are written to disk. Near the 
beginning of the disk is the component I’ve named the 
verifier, followed by two identical copies of the original 
MBR. In another section of the disk is the main 
component of the bootkit, rkImage, followed by the 
backdoor that was installed. 
One peculiar thing the malware does is install a 
second copy of the rkImage and backdoor files. This 
copy is encrypted identically to the first, and positioned 
such that it ends exactly 2063 sectors from the end of 
the drive. What makes this strange is that nothing in the 
bootkit will ever transfer execution to the second copy, 
and that the second copy is only installed if the drive has 
at least 30% free space. Kaspersky erroneously 
identified this behavior as only installing if the disk has 
greater than 30% free space, rather than installing a 
redundant copy of itself. As can be seen in a Windows 
7 screenshot from the supplemental files, the bootkit is 
perfectly capable of installing with less than 30% free 
space. The only guess the authors make as to the purpose 
of this second copy is for the indented backdoor to be 
able to identify if one of the copies has been modified 
after it starts. The dropper will also detect a modified 
copy with the “check” command. 
 
 
Figure 3. Physical disk layout written by DEBUGFILE.sys 
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4. MBR  
 
For all x86 systems not running UEFI, the boot 
process starts with the BIOS loading the Master Boot 
Record into memory and jumping to it. By convention, 
the BIOS loads the MBR to the physical memory 
address of 0x7C00. Another convention that many 
MBRs follow is to copy themselves, a single 0x200 
sized sector, to the address 0x600 and then transfer 
execution to this location. The HDRoot bootkit is no 
exception. This is partly because the only code it 
actually changes in the original MBR is the jump 
address and the code jumped to. Most of the original 
MBR and partition table information is intact. 
A normal MBR would look at the partition table to 
find the partition with the boot flag set, and then load the 
volume boot sector of that partition and transfer 
execution. HDRoot’s MBR works similarly by calling 
interrupt 13 to read two sectors from disk into memory 
at the address 0x7A00 (through 0x7DFF). These are the 
verifier and the original MBR, which now has been 
loaded into the location where the MBR would have 
originally loaded on a non-infected system. The bootkit 
does not store these on disk in clear text, however. They 
are written to disk having been XOR’d with the byte 
value 0x76. The supplemental files have a C utility that 
can be used to decrypt the values. A function at offset 
MBR+0x88 performs these read and decrypt operations, 
copies the partition table from the infected MBR to the 
original (incase the victim has changed any partitions 
since the bootkit was installed), and then transfers 
execution to the verifier. 
 
5. Verifier  
 
The job of the verifier is to make sure that the bootkit 
is intact and that a specific set of criteria are met before 
allowing the bootkit to run. If any of these criteria fail 
the verifier will transfer the boot process to the original 
MBR, now at 0x7C00, without the bootkit executing. 
This mechanism helps prevent bricking the victim 
machine in the event that one or more of the bootkit 
sectors are corrupted or overwritten.  
The first criteria in the verifier process is a check for 
whether the alt key is pressed on the keyboard. If the alt 
key is pressed, the bootkit launch will be aborted. The 
verifier then checks for a value at 0x7A08 (+0x8 from 
the verifier start address). If the value is null, the startup 
is aborted. This value is the drive identifier of where 
rkImage and the backdoor are stored. This was 0x80 in 
all the systems tested, which indicates drive 0. The 
dropper sets this value, and the subsequent bytes, before 
writing them to disk. This ensures that the bootkit was 
properly setup during install, and allows for the bootkit 
to be stored on a separate disk from the system disk. 
Table 2 shows a breakdown of the rkImage information 
stored in the verifier.  
The third and final check done by the verifier is 
computing a CRC16 value on the obfuscated contents of 
rkImage and the backdoor (still only encrypted with an 
XOR 0x76). It compares the results to the saved CRC, 
and if they do not match it aborts. Otherwise it reads the 
entire rkImage, but not the backdoor, to 0x10000, and 
Figure 5. Infected MBR code to 
load, decrypt verifier 
 
Figure 4. Address layout of 
memory loaded before rkImage 
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then decrypts both. The last step is to copy the size and 
location information to the start of rkImage, so it can 
locate the backdoor for installing. 
 
Table 2. rkImage location information in verifier 
 
Address Contents 
0x7A02 0x55AA, not used, signals start of 
rkImage location data. 
0x7A04 CRC16 value for rkImage+Backdoor.  
0x7A06 Sector count for rkImage+Backdoor. 
0x7A08 Drive number 
0x7A09 Sector where rkImage+Backdoor starts. 
0x7A0D Next 0x55AA value, if present 
… … 
 
6. rkImage  
 
A significant component to reverse engineering the 
functionality of this bootkit was becoming familiar with 
the mechanics of low-level, pre-OS x86. For anyone 
looking to get into this the Intermediate Intel x86 videos 
on OpenSecurityTraining.info are highly recommended 
[5]. Even just following the transition from the verifier 
to rkImage requires some understanding of these 
mechanics, as the processor is still in 16-bit real mode 
at this time and a far jump is being performed, crossing 
a barrier between segments. This seems like a trivial 
thing until you find out that GDB, even operating in 
8086 mode remotely debugging the bootkit running in 
QEMU, has absolutely zero understanding of segment 
addressing and completely falls apart trying to set 
breakpoints at any address higher than 0xFFFF. In 
retrospect Bochs might have been a better choice for this 
over QEMU, but not being familiar with it either the 
author struggled through with QEMU, performing most 
of the analysis indirectly, either statically or 
dynamically through the clues left behind by the 
bootkit’s actions.  
The first task rkImage sets itself to, like any sane 
bootloader, is to transfer itself from real mode to 
protected mode and then to 32-bit mode. In order to 
enable protected mode, the Global Descriptor Table 
must be setup and loaded. This is actually fairly 
unimportant to the operation of the malware but 
understanding it helped with getting the disassembly 
properly setup in IDA Pro to assist with the process. The 
details regarding and the contents of the segment 
descriptors are outside of the scope of this paper, but for 
anyone looking to make an analysis of them, the clearest 
explanations and diagrams were found in the AMD 
Architecture Programmer’s Manual, Vol 2., for system 
programming [6]. Something that caused confusion was 
that most diagrams detailing the structure of segment 
descriptors (the entries in the Global Descriptor Table) 
are for the descriptors in 64-bit mode, since the 32-bit 
descriptors, called legacy segment descriptors in 
AMD’s documentation, have a different structure. The 
work done reassembling the GDT can be seen in the 
rkImage IDB file in the supplemental files.  
Once setup in a 32-bit environment, rkImage 
decrypts two sections in itself, the first containing a 32-
bit DLL, and the second containing a 64-bit DLL. These 
are used to launch the backdoor from a Windows system 
service upon Windows booting. Each DLL has a 4-byte 
XOR key. The data is stored in rkImage in the format: 
4-byte key, 4-byte length, encrypted PE file contents. 
The 32-bit DLL and its data are located at an offset of 
0x4BE0 and the 64-bit values are at 0x6DE8, 
immediately after the previous DLL. These DLLs as 
packaged contain the registry path to the LanmanServer 
service DLL. The version of rkImage in this sample, 
installed by the 64-bit dropper, overwrites the 
LanmanServer information with the paths and values for 
the Schedule service. This allows for changing the target 
service without the need to recompile the DLLs 
embedded in rkImage. Kaspersky's observations that 
there are a number of different services that different 
samples have targeted supports this conclusion. 
The backdoor executable is then loaded into memory 
and decrypted with the 0x76 XOR operation. At the end 
of this preparation work of loading, decrypting, and 
copying data, rkImage calls a function that is marked as 
DETERMINE_VERSION_NT_32_64_BIT in the 
supplemental disassembly. This is the function that 
determines what Windows version is installed, what 
malicious DLL to use, and where to install it. Since the 
malware will attempt to boot in any Windows version 
from Windows 2000 to Windows 10, there is a 
considerable nest of switch and if statements happening 
here. It first checks whether there is a “\winnt” directory, 
which is present in Windows 2000, and then if "\winnt" 
is not found it will subsequently check in 
“\windows\system32\kernel32.dll”. The check for 
kernel32.dll in system32 prevents the bootkit from 
continuing install on Windows 98 and lower systems, as 
kernel32.dll was stored in the system directory rather 
than system32 before this point. If kernel32.dll is found 
it will check for “\users” and “\documents and settings” 
to determine if it is XP/2003, or Vista or newer. If it is 
not able to locate any of these, it falls out of the switch 
statement and no bootkit is installed. 
If the directory selected was not “\winnt”, it will 
check for “\windows\syswow64” and set a variable 
indicating if the system is 64-bit. This is used later when 
choosing which DLL to install (which means it is even 
64-bit Windows XP / Server 2003 compatible). Then for 
each of the three operating system categories it will 
write the backdoor to %TEMP%\Explorer.exe  
6064
 (wherever %TEMP% is located for that version of 
Windows), and iterate through a list of files. If the file is 
present it will copy the appropriate DLL into the 
beginning of the file, overwriting the contents already  
there. The files to be overwritten in question are 
shown in Table 3, and appear to be carefully selected to 
cause the least potential problems, with all but one of 
them being for different architectures than the running 
host. 
Windows 2000 will attempt to first overwrite the 
access.hlp file, which, if anyone has not already disabled 
the help popups, may cause errors. Similarly, the 16-bit 
OLESVR.DLL file is overwritten if access.hlp does not 
exist. This will only cause issues if it is used by a 16-bit 
Windows Version Path 
Windows 2000 \winnt\help\access.hlp 
Windows 2000 \winnt\system\OLESVR.DLL 
Windows XP or 2003 \windows\twain.dll 
Windows XP or 2003 \windows\system\OLESVR.DLL 
Windows Vista/2008 & Newer \windows\syswow64\C_932.NLS 
Windows Vista/2008 & Newer \windows\system\OLESVR.DLL 
Windows Vista/2008 & Newer \windows\syswow64\kmddsp.tsp 
Windows Vista/2008 & Newer \windows\syswow64\Irclass.dll 
Figure 6. Diagram showing the out-of-OS boot process 
Table 3. Service DLL Paths by OS, in order attempted 
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application, as 32-bit applications will be using the 
system32\OLESVR32.DLL file. Windows XP will 
attempt to overwrite the 16-bit version of the twain.dll 
library for scanners (even using old scanners, 
twain32.dll should be used), and then the 16-bit 
OLESVR.DLL if the twain.dll is not found.  
In 64-bit Windows Vista and newer systems, the 
default target is C_932.NLS, which is a 32-bit National 
Language Support file for the Japanese language [7]. 
This assumes that authors did not plan on infecting 
targets running 32-bit applications in Japanese, as this 
would cause issues. The only file that will be tried for 
32-bit Windows Vista and newer is the same 16-bit 
OLESVR.DLL. This will only cause issues for 
applications run in 16-bit compatibility/emulation 
mode, as they are not natively supported in Vista and 
newer, and is therefore unlikely to affect most targets. 
The other two potential target files, which are also 
unlikely to be used, are both 16-bit DLLs found in the 
syswow64 (32-bit compatibility) directory. They are 
actually only labeled as compatible with Windows 
Server 2003 and earlier operating systems on MSDN, 
but are for some reason still included in the syswow64 
directory. Kmddsp.tsp is a “kernel mode device driver” 
for “telephony service provider” network drivers, and 
IRClass.dll is an Infrared Class Coinstaller [8]. Neither 
should ever be used on a 64-bit system and therefore 
won’t cause any issues if overwritten. 
Once the DLL has been written to the appropriate 
file, the registry is patched to overwrite the Schedule 
service’s DLL path with the path to the overwritten file. 
This should be approximately: 
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Schedul
e\Parameters\ServiceDLL. 
rkImage will then return to 16-bit real mode, 
handing execution back to the original MBR at 0x7C00, 
allowing the boot process to continue and Windows to 
load. It is worth noting that since Windows NT also used 
the C:\WINNT directory, it will match the first section 
of the bootkit which chooses the files to write the DLL 
into. However, since Windows did not introduce the 
svchost.exe process until Windows 2000, services did 
not have a Parameters sub-key or a ServiceDLL value 
in Windows NT. As such, if installed on Windows NT 
the bootkit wouldn't be able to locate the registry key for 
editing, and would fail out of the installation process. 
Additionally, it is likely that 32-bit versions of the 
dropper would not allow the install to a Windows 2000 
system. 
 
7. Schedule Service DLL  
 
The final component of the bootkit, responsible for 
running the backdoor within Windows, is the DLL that 
replaced the Schedule service. The bootkit did not 
change the rest of the registry key, so it will be loaded 
Figure 7. Flow of the malicious Schedule service 
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into a svchost.exe executable. The Schedule service is 
part of the NetworkService group, so the DLL will be 
loaded into the svchost.exe containing the other services 
for the group, and a new thread will be spawned to run 
the ServiceMain for that DLL. Additionally, as happens 
every time a DLL is loaded, the DLL’s entry point 
(DLLMain, in this case) is called by the Windows loader 
in another thread. 
The HDRoot authors chose to use the DLLMain 
function to start the backdoor process and ServiceMain 
to revert the service registry entry back to the original 
path. The DLLMain thread creates another thread 
running the function that is identified in the disassembly 
as SpawnBackdoorThread. That thread creates a process 
running the backdoor, which rkImage saved to 
%TEMP%\Explorer.exe. It then sets a global variable in 
the DLL to signal that it successfully launched the 
backdoor, and suspends itself before continuing. 
Simultaneously the ServiceMain thread reverts the 
registry, and waits for the backdoor to start, sleeping and 
periodically checking for the flag to be set. After the flag 
is set it resumes the SpawnBackdoor thread, and then 
exits. In turn, the SpawnBackdoor thread unloads the 
DLL from memory and then exits itself. 
This has the effect of both threads exiting and the 
DLL unloading at almost the exact same time, 
guaranteeing that the service manager will have to 
restart the service, causing the legitimate service DLL 
to be loaded and run from the patched registry entry. In 
all tests of this sample, not once did the real Windows 
service ever fail to start after running the bootkit. This is 
completely contrary to Kaspersky’s claim that the 
bootkit breaks the service and that all the victims must 
just not have cared or noticed that the service failed to 
start.  
 
8. Conclusions  
 
The analysis of the HDRoot malware shows this 
sample to have a sophisticated and functional 
implementation. As is problematic and common with 
much work in the malware analysis field, Kaspersky’s 
published findings were released without enough detail 
to verify. Additionally, no work was done to verify their 
findings prior to this analysis. The discrepancies 
between the conclusions in their report and the technical 
findings in this analysis leads the author to the 
conclusion than that they did their entire analysis with 
and presented research on a ten-year-old sample, but 
provided the signature indicators for the 2012 sample 
that had been in modern use. It also shows that the 
authors, who have been designated as the WINNTI 
group, have been around for a significant period of time, 
dating back to at least 2006 if the timestamps on 
Kaspersky’s sample are to be believed.  
The one stage of the attack in which the bootkit did 
not make good use of hiding techniques was in covering 
its tracks for the service and backdoor executables. Both 
the modified file hosting the DLL (in most tests 
C:\Windows\syswow64\C_932.NLS) and the backdoor 
in %TEMP%\Explorer.exe were left intact on the file 
system. However, it is likely that a sophisticated 
backdoor run by the bootkit would know to remove 
these two pieces of evidence after starting itself, and it 
may just have been a choice of segregation of duties 
made by the authors. 
Another criticism that can be made is the extremely 
weak use of encryption. The XOR cipher is little more 
than obfuscation and was trivial to figure out even just 
looking at the encrypted sectors on the disk. It can be 
argued, however, that since the entire contents of the 
bootkit is code that will be decrypted before it can be 
run, there is little point in hiding it from anything but 
simple scans, as it could just be captured from memory 
by analysts. To that end, the simple cipher serves its 
purpose of not matching the signatures for executables 
or of a boot sector while on disk.  
Overall the level of detail that went into making this 
malware was significant. It is capable of installing itself 
on any Windows version, 32 or 64-bit, dating back to 
Windows 2000, with the exception of newer installs 
using UEFI. The lack of UEFI support is unlikely to be 
an issue when targeting server systems, however, 
especially with virtualization on the rise, as very few 
virtual environments are virtualizing UEFI in their 
guests. The small touches, such as anticipating that the 
drive may have been repartitioned, show particular 
thought and foresight (or testing) by the authors. Clearly 
significant thought and work went into the creation of 
this bootkit, and it is a mistake to dismiss it as amateur. 
While different versions of the dropper are geared 
toward different targets (the observed sample here 
targets the Schedule service on 64-bit systems), the 
overall framework is very flexible. The choices made 
inside the dropper or when compiling the dropper are 
able to be tuned toward the target, choosing a service 
compatible with that version of Windows. This makes 
narrowing down the traits of the bootkit from which 
services it targets to be very difficult, as it is trivial for 
the authors to change their target. 
Overall, this exercise shows that the analysis done 
by security companies would be more useful to the 
security field if their results were published in enough 
detail to be verifiable by outside sources. Most 
companies guard the particulars of their research as 
proprietary information, not sharing how their findings 
were discovered. But security defenders rely on these 
descriptions of attacks, not just file hash signatures, to 
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look for, detect, and build behavioral signatures for 
these newly discovered threats. It becomes ineffective 
for them to do so when they are provided 
misinformation and no resources to check these 
conclusions in a timely manner. While public disclosure 
of these threats is a great benefit to the security industry, 
on the whole it would be better served if more 
companies would publish in-depth and reproducible 
results.  
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